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S ILENT PART NER S : THE ROLE OF UNPAI D  








The term ‘‘unpaid market labor’’ refers to the direct contributions of unpaid 
family members to market work that officially belongs to another member of 
the household. Thus one individual may be construed legally as an owner or 
entrepreneur, but relatives may help out informally with business operations. 
Likewise, in corporate or public-service settings, certain employees rely on the 
unpaid help of an executive spouse or political wife. This paper argues that 
unpaid market labor is conceptually distinct from both paid work and unpaid 
domestic labor. Legal cases from Canada are used to illustrate the policy 
implications of this insight and how dichotomous thinking about the market 
and the family obscures this kind of work. The article discusses insights and 
challenges for feminist political economy in theorizing unpaid market labor. 
KEYWORDS  





This paper discusses a form of unpaid work that has largely been invisible in 
studies of both paid and unpaid labor in highly industrialized countries 
such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia: the 
involvement of family members in bread-winning activities that are the 
official responsibility of only one person in the household. To offer a few 
classic examples, this is the work of the unpaid relative who helps out in the 
back room of the family business, the executive spouse who organizes 
 corporate functions, the political wife who campaigns with and informally 
advises her husband, or the farm wife who shares in operations and 
management but lacks formal status as a co-owner or employee. The term 
‘‘unpaid market labor’’ is used here to describe these and other 
contributions to the paid work of individuals who are construed legally 
and socially as individual employees, public officials, or entrepreneurs. It 
reflects this paper’s overarching claim that unpaid market labor is distinct 
from both unpaid domestic labor and paid market work in ways that matter 
to feminist legal and economic theory. 
Unpaid market labor does not map easily onto the familiar dichotomies 
of market versus family and paid versus unpaid work that frame most 
feminist as well as conventional analyses of Western women’s labor. Though 
provided in a familial context, it goes beyond the childcare, housekeeping, 
and other tasks generally understood as domestic. It includes tasks that are 
harder to distinguish from the work of the remunerated family member, 
are often done in the same physical location, and contribute more visibly to 
market earnings. Yet, unpaid market labor is not directly remunerated and 
does not carry the legal rights or obligations of employment or self- 
employment. 
This paper seeks to demonstrate both the public-policy relevance of 
unpaid market labor and its significance for feminist political economic 
 theory. It draws upon tax judgments from Canada to illustrate how this 
form of work often disappears into a conceptual gap between market and 
family labor, obscuring its many implications for economic gender 
equality. Yet the sociological studies reviewed here show that unpaid 
market labor is essential to family livelihoods in highly industrialized 
countries, in a wide variety of economic sectors and class settings. These 
findings raise new questions for feminist theorizing about labor markets 
and the care economy. Greater attention to unpaid market labor may 
show that markets and households are not just interdependent, but 
fundamentally inseparable in the process of social reproduction. In order 
to address these questions, more detailed empirical knowledge is 
required about the nature and extent of unpaid market labor being 
undertaken by different population groups across industries and 
countries. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF UNPAID MARKET LABOR: THE 
EXAMPLE OF TAXATION LAW  
This research began through my teaching of Canadian taxation law when I 
encountered cases in which individual taxpayers argued that some portion 
of their income should be attributed to an unpaid family member who 
 actively assisted with the taxpayer’s business or employment duties. I review 
a small selection of these cases to illustrate how unpaid market labor tends 
to fall into a conceptual blind spot between waged work and domestic life 
in Canada and the difficulties this poses for adjudicators and policy makers. 
Similar issues are likely to arise under the income tax laws of other 
countries and in a range of other public policy fields. 
Unpaid work is officially outside the scope of the Canadian income tax, 
which like other income tax systems around the world, is designed to catch 
only monetized forms of income and expense. Indeed, feminist legal 
scholars have argued that one of the main sources of gender bias in tax 
policy is its tendency to focus exclusively on market income and to 
disregard the economic benefits flowing from household production 
(Nancy C. Staudt 1996; Lisa Philipps 2002). Unpaid work is not taxed 
directly but can still generate tax issues because of its close relationship to 
the income-earning activities of another individual or firm. The technical 
issues vary among cases and countries, but the common theme is that a 
business owner or employee seeks to avoid tax on some portion of their 
income, which they argue is properly allocated to a family member who 
provided informal assistance with the work. Thus, the taxpayers in these 
cases seek to characterize the family member’s work as a form of productive 
and commercially valuable labor, even though it was not compensated in 
 money. The revenue authorities, on the other hand, seek to characterize 
the unpaid work as a personal, familial activity, or even a form of leisure, 
unrelated to the earning of income. Judges must choose between these 
dichotomous characterizations for purposes of determining tax liability. 
The decisions fall into two groups, described here as the ‘‘executive 
spouse’’ cases and the ‘‘family business’’ cases. 
 
The executive spouse 
These cases deal with employees whose spouses accompany them on 
business trips at the company’s expense. The legal issue in Canada is 
whether the employer’s payment of a spouse’s travel costs constitutes a 
taxable benefit to the employee. This in turn depends on whether the 
spouse’s presence was primarily for the employee’s personal benefit (in 
which case it is taxable), or primarily for the benefit of the employer (in 
which case it is non-taxable). The cases discussed below were decided 
between 1966 and 1996 and most involve management or executive level 
employees. With one exception, they all deal with male employees 
accompanied by their wives. In all the cases involving male employees, 
the Courts referred to evidence about the tasks done by the wives. The 
most pervasive theme is the wives’ role in mediating relationships. They 
 facilitated interactions with business associates, suppliers, or customers and 
otherwise nurtured the social framework for business activity. The wives 
attended training seminars alongside their husbands; hosted and attended 
receptions, dinners, and other social events; and were often responsible 
for shepherding and monitoring the wives of lower-level employees 
attending the convention or meeting. While the fact patterns are often 
similar in these cases, the judgments are divided between those that 
characterize the spouse’s accompaniment as mere personal companionship 
(giving rise to a taxable benefit) and those that determine the spouse to be 
contributing to the business aims of the trip. 
Taxpayers invariably argued that spouses were along to serve the 
employers’ business interests. For example, in Shambrook v. Minister of 
National Revenue, the president of a metalwares company argued: 
It was necessary for [his wife] . . . to accompany him to the President’s 
Reception and Buffet Supper, to take part in other social activities 
attended by delegates and their wives during the course of the 
convention, to meet and fraternize with the wives of others attending 
the convention, and thus promote a general atmosphere of friendship 
and goodwill with both competitors and customers (or potential 
customers). (Tax Appeal Board 1966: 21). 
 The Tax Appeal Board rejected this portrayal of the wife’s activities and 
held that the company had conferred a taxable benefit on the husband by 
paying her travel expenses: 
[T]he benefit received by Mr. Shambrook . . . might properly be said to 
have been of a personal nature in that he had been able to enjoy the 
companionship of his wife at the convention as well as the social 
advantages of attending the various functions as her escort rather than 
alone. (Tax Appeal Board 1966: 23) 
This reasoning was echoed in Paton v. Minister of National Revenue (Tax 
Appeal Board 1968), when a senior executive of a bank argued that there 
was a business purpose for his wife’s attendance at regional meetings, 
especially so that she could evaluate the wives of local branch managers. He 
stated: 
[E]xperience has shown that in the operation of a branch the manager’s 
wife can play an important role in the business development and 
servicing fields. Because of this, it is important that the wife be aware of 
the bank’s objectives and that the bank be in a position to assess the 
wife’s contribution. In making this evaluation . . . the executive’s wife can 
be of considerable assistance. (Tax Appeal Board 1968: 198) 
In rejecting the taxpayer’s argument and upholding the government’s 
 assessment of a taxable benefit the Board questioned the skills that Mrs. Paton 
could bring to this role: 
There is no evidence that Mrs. Paton spent any time in the head office of 
the bank to learn the intricacies of banking practice; neither was there 
any evidence that she had any special fitness or training to enable her to 
pass judgment on the abilities and qualities of the various people she 
would meet fleetingly at the social function . . . (Tax Appeal Board 1968: 
201). 
The courts in Shambrook and Paton therefore saw the wives’ activities as 
fundamentally personal and not part of the networking, advertising, customer 
relations, and human resources management that are essential to the 
generation of business profits. 
A valid policy concern of both revenue authorities and Courts in these 
cases is to prevent tax avoidance by high-income earners who seek merely 
to shift income to a spouse in a lower tax bracket, as suggested by the 
following passage: 
Mr. Paton’s tax return shows him to be in receipt of a highly substantial 
salary as one would expect of a senior executive in one of the chartered 
banks in Canada. Nevertheless he seeks to be relieved of taxation in 
respect of the . . . expenses incurred on behalf of his wife when she 
 accompanied him to Western Canada. (Tax Appeal Board 1968: 201). 
From this perspective, the cases appear to pit the interests of class (or 
vertical) equity against the recognition of women’s unpaid labor. This 
framing of the issue places class and gender equality interests in conflict, 
not unlike Symes vs. The Queen, in which a Canadian lawyer sought 
unsuccessfully to deduct her nanny’s salary as an expense of carrying on 
business (Supreme Court of Canada 1994; Audrey Macklin 1992). Notably, 
however, the courts in the Paton and Shambrook cases did not challenge the 
business nature of social hosting activities for the executives themselves. 
They had no difficulty recognizing the employees’ own attendance at 
receptions and dinners as part of the income-earning process. The fact that 
these events also met the executives’ personal needs for food, drink, and 
entertainment raised no problem of class inequity for the courts. 
Indeed other cases from the same time period (late 1960s/early 1970s) in 
Canada reached the opposite conclusion by allowing travel expenses for an 
executive spouse to be reimbursed without tax. A good example is Hale v. 
Canada, where the manager of an insurance company brought his wife to a 
conference of insurance brokers held at a resort in Phoenix, Arizona at the 
company’s expense (Exchequer Court 1969). The Court held there was no 
taxable benefit to Mr. Hale due to his wife’s extensive involvement in 
conference activities and the fact that her presence was ‘‘tantamount to 
 being obligatory’’ within the corporate culture of the insurance company 
(Exchequer Court 1969: 262). This case provides a fascinating glimpse of 
the extent to which certain employers have relied upon executive spouses to 
help run their operations. As the court found, 
 
The company has a strong preference for married men over those who 
are unmarried. It does not hire an applicant as a salesman . . . if his wife 
does not meet the company standards. The wife is interviewed separately 
and in person prior to hiring the husband, and . . . when [Mr. Hale] 
engaged a salesman this interview of the applicant’s wife was done by his 
wife who reported her assessment of the [applicant’s] wife to him. The 
company maintains a direct liaison with the wife through all stages of her 
husband's career. She is sent correspondence and pamphlets giving 
instructions and guidance on how to help her husband . . . Canada Life 
regards the combination of the husband and wife as the selling unit in 
the business and takes active steps to foster the wife’s participation, but 
they do not pay her. (Exchequer Court 1969: 261) 
 
The tasks that the court considered as relevant to the business objectives of 
the conference included the following: 
Mrs. Hale assumed the responsibility of looking after wives of the 
 salesmen, arranging the assignment of rooms in congenial company, 
finding their baggage lost in transit, urging their attendance at the 
business sessions and observing and reporting any absentees to her 
husband . . . She attempted to broaden her knowledge of her husband’s 
business by attending their instructional meetings . . . She acted as the 
appellant’s hostess at informal gatherings arranged by her husband for 
his colleagues and their wives . . . In short she acted as a kind of mother 
superior to the branch salesmen’s wives. (Exchequer Court 1969: 263) 
Contrary to the Shambrook and Paton cases discussed above, the court in Hale 
was satisfied that ‘‘this was not a holiday for her at the company’s expense’’ 
(Exchequer Court 1969: 264). Likewise in Philp vs. Canada, where the 
taxpayer managed a grocery store, the court found that wives contributed 
useful knowledge about the preferences of women customers and also 
ensured the convention would be ‘‘more orderly and businesslike’’ 
(implying they would discourage wild behavior by the men) (Exchequer 
Court 1970: 500). 
While the images of the corporate spouse in these cases may seem 
outdated, very similar issues arose in Lowe v. Her Majesty the Queen (Federal 
Court of Appeal 1996). Mrs. Lowe accompanied her husband, an account 
executive with an insurance company, on a trip to New Orleans. The trip 
was an incentive reward for independent brokers who sold the company’s 
 products, and the Lowes were responsible for guiding and assisting brokers 
and their wives and nurturing relationships with them throughout the 
‘‘four sun-filled days and fun-filled nights’’ promised in the program 
(Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6228 – 9). In holding that Mrs. Lowe’s 
company-paid travel did not constitute a taxable benefit to Mr. Lowe, the 
Court acknowledged that times had changed, and spouses probably are not 
as heavily obliged to attend such functions as they were at the time of Hale 
(Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6230). Nonetheless, Mrs. Lowe did attend, 
and the Court found she spent virtually all her time assisting her husband. 
This included attending a training session with her husband on ‘‘how to 
deal with the brokers, when to discuss business during the four days, where 
to sit during meals and also to arrange meetings with brokers and senior 
management’’ (Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6227). For example, account 
executives were told to encourage brokers and their wives to sign up for 
guided tours, and while on the tours, Mrs. Lowe would talk with the other 
wives while Mr. Lowe discussed business with the brokers. Given their 
constant involvement with such activities, the Court held that any personal 
enjoyment was ‘‘merely incidental to what was primarily a business trip by 
both spouses for the purpose of advancing the employer’s business 
interests’’ (Federal Court of Appeal 1996: 6230). 
The Lowe case suggests that the executive-spouse role is not a mere relic 
 of the past. While fewer women may be full-time executive spouses to the 
exclusion of their own careers, this has not made the role obsolete. Rather, 
unpaid market labor is more likely being transformed along with other 
aspects of women’s work. It may be provided more intermittently as an 
additional shift of labor by a spouse with a paid job of her own, or it may 
draw upon skills or status acquired by women through their own careers. 
Despite such changes, the Lowe case reflects a continued reliance upon 
women to facilitate the human relationships needed for business success. 
An important question is whether women employees have comparable 
access to the services of an executive spouse, as they seek higher positions in 
corporate management. One case from 1993 dealt with a woman 
operations manager who was asked by her employer to join a group 
traveling to Japan to visit the offices of a key supplier. The court found that 
the trip ‘‘was not merely offered to her . . . she was politely, but I gathered 
firmly, requested to go’’ to avoid the embarrassment of spaces being left 
open (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para.7). The employer also requested 
that she take her husband. She agreed with some reluctance in light of the 
cost to her husband’s own work time and possibly vacation time. It is 
notable that none of the other cases mentioned any concerns about the 
personal or career costs to wives of accompanying their husbands on 
business travel. 
 Though acknowledging the relatively mandatory nature of the trip, the 
Court held that the reimbursement of the husband’s expenses was a taxable 
benefit ‘‘since his trip was of no benefit to the company of which I am 
aware’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para. 15), and since Ms. McMillan 
ultimately made the choice to include him. Justice Taylor stated: although 
‘‘rejecting that condition might have meant she did not go on the trip, I 
regard it as a conscious decision to take the opportunity on her part’’ (Tax 
Court of Canada 1993: para. 16). In contrast to the cases discussed earlier, 
the judge did not describe the husband’s specific activities but mentioned 
only that the itinerary included ‘‘the usual mix of social events’’ and more 
direct business activities (Tax Court of Canada 1993: para. 3). There was no 
recognition that the husband was assisting his wife or her employer to 
achieve the business objectives of the trip, even though his physical 
presence was obviously thought to be important to make the right impression 
on the supplier. As a result, the value of his trip was added to 
McMillan’s employment income for tax purposes. 
Overall, then, Canadian tax jurisprudence has been conflicted about 
whether the activities of an executive spouse primarily serve a business or 
family purpose. While factual distinctions can of course be identified, they 
are not so obvious as to explain by themselves why the Courts reached 
opposing conclusions in these cases. The same pattern of seemingly 
 irreconcilable decisions repeats itself in the family business cases. 
 
The family business 
In these cases, the taxpayer owns a business and attempts to split the profits 
for income tax purposes with a family member who is taxed at a lower rate. 
Taxpayers have an incentive to split income with lower earners under any 
system of progressive rates, though the technical means employed will vary 
with the economic circumstances and depending on how the tax law is 
designed. Many jurisdictions have struggled to define when income 
splitting is inappropriate and to draft effective anti-avoidance rules 
(Maureen Donnelly, Joanne Magee, and Allister Young 2000; UK Inland 
Revenue n.d.). A key issue in some cases is whether the family member 
provided business-related services that justify an allocation of profits or 
wages. Disputes can then arise over the nature and value of unpaid market 
labor. The difficulty of knowing when authorities or courts will characterize 
such work as business or personal activity is illustrated by two cases, Cullen 
vs. Canada (Tax Court of Canada 1985a) and Wessell vs. Canada (Tax Court 
Canada 1985b). 
In both cases, the taxpayer claimed he was carrying on a business 
partnership with his wife, who was therefore entitled to report a share of 
 profits. The court reached opposite decisions in the two cases despite 
strikingly similar fact patterns. Both involved small businesses in which the 
husband initially reported all the income as a sole proprietor and later 
switched to filing as a partnership on the advice of professional 
accountants. The evidence established that the businesses were managed 
and operated jointly by husband and wife. However, there was no written 
partnership agreement, nor did the wife receive wages or any other formal 
compensation for her labor. The issue was whether the couple met the 
legal definition of partnership as a relationship between persons 
‘‘carrying on a business in common, with a view of profit’’ (Tax Court of 
Canada 1985a: 412).1 As both judges acknowledged, the absence of a 
written contract is not fatal if the parties’ conduct indicates there was an 
oral or implied partnership agreement (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 412; 
Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 208 – 9). Evidence detailing how the couples 
shared responsibility for their businesses reveals strong parallels between 
the two cases. 
The Wessells operated three separate enterprises: a trailer park, a farm, and a 
construction business. The court found that Mrs. Wessell contributed to the 
‘‘physical requirements’’ of all three; she also negotiated contracts and 
‘‘was recognized and accepted by the public as an active and 
authoritative person in the operation’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 207). 
 Justice Taylor commented: 
[I]n many aspects of the operations Mrs. Wessell acted and functioned 
virtually independently of the appellant – her husband – indeed without 
even consulting him, while at the same time on many other aspects he 
consulted with her before signing contracts, buying equipment, etc. It 
could well be said that in matters of finance she was actually in control of 
the funds. (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 207) 
The couple divided their labor differently in each of their businesses: ‘‘With 
regard to the construction business, the appellant was the major element, and his 
wife did provide substantial assistance. For the ‘trailer park’ . . . Mrs. Wessell 
was the major motivator, consulted and aided by Mr. Wessell’’ (Tax Court 
of Canada 1985b: 209). Based on their conduct, the court held that the 
Wessells had a valid partnership that was affirmed by their decision to file 
tax returns as partners, each reporting a share of the profits from each 
business (Tax Court of Canada 1985b: 209). 
As in the Wessell case, the Cullens also had three businesses: an oil 
distributorship, a farm, and a racehorse operation. With respect to the farm, 
the judge found that both spouses were ‘‘equally involved in all 
aspects of the operation’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 410). In addition to 
a wide range of manual and marketing tasks, ‘‘Caroline was fully involved in 
 all decisions . . . and it was her particular responsibility to maintain the 
necessary books and records’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 410). Later she 
was also heavily involved in the oil agency: 
The nature of the business was such that at certain times . . . Cullen would 
be required to spend all of his time away from the agency office . . . As a 
result Caroline was the person responsible for the day to day manage- 
ment of the agency. This included everything from answering the 
telephone to the preparing and rendering of accounts to customers. She 
did all of the banking, kept all the books of account, and in recent years 
has had the responsibility for the operation of the computer . . . It was her 
evidence that . . . she customarily worked five days a week from 8:30 in the 
morning to 5:00 in the afternoon (and often longer during busy seasons). 
She has never been paid a salary. (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 411) 
Likewise both spouses were involved in all decisions relating to the 
racehorse operation, and Mrs. Cullen maintained ‘‘all of the racing 
documents, breeding records and the books of account’’ (Tax Court of 
Canada 1985a: 411). 
In this case, however, the court found there was no legal partnership, 
stressing that most assets as well as loans and advertisements were held in Mr. 
Cullen’s name alone (though Caroline had an interest in farm land pledged 
 as security for a loan and had signing authority on bank accounts) (Tax 
Court of Canada 1985a: 411, 413). With respect to the oil distributorship, the 
couple testified that Imperial Oil would not allow Mrs. Cullen to sign the 
purchase documents as a partner but insisted on dealing with Mr. Cullen 
alone (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 411). Justice Sarchuk gave little credence 
to this testimony, questioning why Mrs. Cullen did not speak to her lawyer or 
accountant about challenging this policy if partnership status was truly 
important to her (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 414). The court concluded 
that although the couple pooled their assets upon marriage, ‘‘this was 
incidental to the formation of the family unit’’ (Tax Court of Canada 1985a: 
414). In contrast to the decision in Wessell, Mrs. Cullen’s contribution of 
unpaid labor was construed ultimately as a function of the family relationship 
and not as evidence of a business relationship. The contradictory results in 
these two cases highlights the law’s ambivalence about the nature of such 
activities and the awkwardness of placing them solely on one side or the other 
of the business/personal divide. 
As a group, the executive spouse and family business cases from Canada 
raise difficult questions about how best to ensure equitable treatment of 
those who provide unpaid market labor. The cases that refused to 
recognize the business nature of the spouses’ activities directly devalued 
their work. Yet in the others, where the taxpayers won their cases, the effect 
 was merely to reduce the male breadwinner’s tax burden with no guarantee 
of compensation actually being received by the spouse. In fact, the pro- 
taxpayer decisions discouraged the creation of formal partnership or 
employment contracts with spouses, since the benefits of income splitting 
can be obtained without doing so. Parallel issues are likely to arise under 
the tax regimes of other countries such as the US, England, and Australia. 
However, this policy conundrum cannot be resolved within the narrow 
conceptual confines of tax law. Rather, it suggests the need to rethink more 
broadly the role of unpaid relatives in securing family livelihoods. Doing so 
will have implications not just for tax law but many aspects of public policy, 
as discussed briefly in the concluding part of this article. 
 
THEORIZING UNPAID MARKET LABOR  
Beyond specific problems of legal policy, the tax cases discussed above raise 
several larger questions for feminist political and economic theory. First 
among these is whether unpaid market labor is properly described as 
‘‘unpaid’’ work. Even if not directly remunerated, might it be paid for 
indirectly through higher wages or profits to the official market actor that 
are then shared within the household among those who have contributed 
to the enterprise? Historical studies of cottage industries in England and 
 Canada have found that women and children were involved directly in 
production, and family wages were set explicitly by reference to the number 
of household members participating in the work (Ivy Pinchbeck 1969: 
121 – 2; Paul Phillips and Erin Phillips 1993: 12 – 14). In contemporary 
times, it seems likely that having a family member available to help with 
one’s work could boost the earning capacity of an individual employee or 
entrepreneur. This may help explain the wage premium enjoyed by 
married men in certain professional and corporate contexts in highly 
industrialized countries (Belinda Hewitt, Mark Western, and Janeen Baxter 
2005). Certainly, the literature on Northern family business identifies 
access to a flexible supply of both paid and unpaid labor within the family 
as a key comparative advantage (Jane Wheelock 1992; Peter Leach, Bruce 
Ball, and Garry Duncan 2003: 7). 
Even if it could be demonstrated empirically that unpaid market labor 
sometimes translates into a higher cash income for the official breadwin- 
ner, the other family member may remain unpaid in the sense of lacking 
legal title to or decision-making power over that income. Neither equal 
sharing nor equal control of resources can be assumed within such families 
(Shelley Phipps and Frances Woolley 2006). The notion that unpaid market 
labor will be compensated indirectly within the family is vulnerable to the 
same criticisms that feminists have leveled at the family wage system of 
 industrial capitalism: that it both assumes and promotes women’s economic 
dependence on male breadwinners (Alice Kessler-Harris 2001). Moreover, 
searching for wage premiums suggests that markets can differentiate 
among individuals on the basis of who has access to the services of an 
unpaid family member. If market work is presumed instead to be collective 
by nature, such that reliance on unpaid market labor is the norm rather 
than the exception, then wage premiums are unlikely to account for all 
such work. 
A further question is whether unpaid market labor is a mere vestige of 
the family-wage ideal, of declining relevance in many industrialized countries 
as women increasingly take on waged work of their own. Even two decades 
ago, Hillary Callan observed that employers in the UK could no longer 
‘‘unreflectingly count on a wife’s willingness to provide unpaid and 
unrecognized services. The growing visibility of symmetrical marriages, 
female executives and men in the position of ‘spouse’ has undermined many 
of the symbolic associations, as well as the concrete expectations’’ of earlier 
times (1984: 4). As more women gain access to the upper tiers of the labor 
market in industrialized countries (Sylvia Walby 2000: 165 – 97; Lourdes 
Beneria 2003: 121 – 4), or enter self-employment in their own right (Karen 
D. Hughes 1999), how is this likely to affect the provision of unpaid market 
labor and its distribution among men and women? This question really has two 
 aspects: (1) whether women will adjust to such changes by providing less 
unpaid market labor to family breadwinners, and (2) whether women’s own 
market opportunities will be affected by their access, or lack thereof, to 
unpaid market labor provided by other family members. It would be 
problematic simply to assume that women are relieved of unpaid market labor 
when they obtain their own paid jobs. Feminist research has demonstrated that 
while gendered work patterns in the US have shifted to some extent, even 
employed women still do more childcare and other unpaid household work 
than men and are more likely to hold poorer jobs on the so-called ‘‘mommy 
track’’ (Carmen Sirianni and Cynthia Negrey 2000; Joan Williams 2000). 
Similarly, women’s changing labor-force participation seems more likely to 
transform rather than eliminate the provision of unpaid market labor. Those 
pursuing a masculine career model of exclusive dedication to the job will still 
face competitive pressures to enlist their wives’ assistance in various 
technical, clerical, social hosting, counseling, charitable, and other status-
mainte- nance functions (Sirianni and Negrey 2000: 67; see also Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter 1977: 106). Recent qualitative studies in Anglo-American countries 
have reported that women provide such services as a third shift, over and 
above their domestic responsibilities and their own waged work (Marian 
Binkley 2002: 33 – 5; Barbara R. Rowe and Gong-Soog Hong 2000: 3), 
sometimes compromising their own positions in the labor market to 
 accommodate a husband’s need for business help (Susan Baines and Jane 
Wheelock 1998: 588 – 90). Indeed, research by Baines and Wheelock suggests 
that the flexibilization of labor markets in the late twentieth century is probably 
increasing the importance of unpaid market labor, as many UK families become 
‘‘re-embedded in the economic institution of the new small business’’ 
(1998: 580, 582). 
Nor has the role of full-time ‘‘corporate wife’’ entirely disappeared in 
these countries (Anne Kingston 2001; Linda Rhodes 2003). Indeed, as 
businesses expand globally and certain employees are called upon to travel 
and relocate frequently, it may become even harder to sustain two careers 
within one family. Some corporate wives assert their role is becoming more 
not less intensive, as expectations rise about women’s business knowledge 
and work becomes more geographically mobile (Betsy Morris 1998). This 
observation resonates with the case discussed earlier in which Mrs. Cullen 
assumed responsibility for operating the computer in the later years of the 
family business. 
There is also some evidence that unequal access to unpaid market labor 
constrains women’s career success. The McMillan case discussed above 
serves as a concrete example of how women employees may be 
disadvantaged in this regard. McMillan’s decision to accede to employer 
pressure to bring her husband on the business trip was made reluctantly, 
 with an awareness that it conflicted with his own employment and personal 
priorities. More broadly, one study of Canadian women business owners 
found they generally had less access than male entrepreneurs to a flexible 
supply of unpaid family assistance (Monica Belcourt, Ronald J. Burke, and 
He´le`ne Lee-Gosselin 1991: 39). All of these questions call for further 
empirical research. 
Another consideration is how gender may be infused or even superseded 
by other dimensions of power in shaping the nature and meanings of unpaid 
market labor in various contexts. This is not to deny the gendered nature 
of unpaid market labor or its important role in white middle-class life. 
Both historically and in contemporary times, the availability of a full- time 
wife dedicated to advancing her husband’s career has been a critical 
signifier of bourgeois economic, sexual, and moral status (Callan 1984: 3 – 
4; Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall 2002: 279 – 87). Baines and 
Wheelock found that even in the new wave of micro-businesses, the division 
of tasks among family members was highly gendered along traditional lines 
(1998: 587 – 8). A wife’s participation in business travel or other functions 
often has been made possible by shifting regular household labor to 
domestic servants, often poorly paid women of color. This analysis could be 
broadened to consider how and why unpaid market labor is provided in 
different class settings, among families with different ethnic connections 
 and racialized identities, by children, husbands, and extended family, 
including male relatives (Janet Finch 1983: 1 – 2). For example, some 
qualitative studies of small businesses in racialized and immigrant 
communities in highly industrialized countries have found that unpaid 
family members including children can play a very important role in 
securing the survival of the business (Kwang Chung Kim and Won Moo 
Hurh 1988: 154; In-Sook Lim 1997: 4; Margaret Walton-Roberts and Daniel 
Hiebert 1997: 6 – 8; Spinder Dhaliwal 1998). Industrial homeworkers are 
another group likely to incorporate family members, including children, 
into the labor process in order to speed production and attempt to generate 
a living wage for the household (Eileen Boris 1994: 94 – 111). These 
studies suggest that more than gender is at play in determining who 
provides and benefits from unpaid market labor. 
Feminist theory must additionally attend to the prescriptive question of 
how unpaid market labor should ideally be treated, whether by rewarding it 
as a valuable form of economic contribution or by discouraging it as an 
inherently oppressive practice. Particularly in the family business context, 
some argue it enhances women’s agency by allowing them greater status 
and influence over family economic decisions and more fulfilling work 
than gender norms would otherwise permit (Seena B. Kohl 1977: 47 – 54; 
Patricia A. Frishkoff and Bonnie M. Brown 1993: 66 – 70; Lim 1997: 21 – 31; 
 Dhaliwal 1998: 463 – 74; Min-Jung Kwak 2002). From this perspective it is 
possible to view joint family enterprises as positive examples of a more 
cooperative, less individualistic form of market activity and a means for 
women to reduce conflict between their market and household 
responsibilities. At the other pole are those who view unpaid market labor 
as a means of keeping educated women out of direct labor market 
competition with men, by giving them a subordinate outlet for their skills 
and ambition (Hanna Papanek 1973: 852 – 72). In her scathing book about 
Canadian political wives, for example, journalist Susan Riley argues that 
such women are ‘‘an embarrassment and disgrace to us all . . . they embody 
a patriarchal notion of female virtue which involves trading off personal 
power for reflected glory’’ (1987: xiii). These opposing perspectives 
resonate with the longstanding debate in feminist theory over ‘‘sameness’’  
versus ‘‘difference’’ approaches to gender equality (Nancy Fraser 1997). 
Other feminist theorists have focused instead on explaining unpaid 
market labor as a gendered practice, which supports the moral order 
underpinning various stages of capitalism. For example, Davidoff and Hall 
suggest that in the transition to industrial capitalism, women acted as 
hidden partners in middle-class enterprises, contributing extensively to 
economic production in ways that were simultaneously consistent with the 
social rank of having a domestic, ‘‘non-working’’ wife (2002: 279 – 87). 
 Dorothy Smith focuses on the moral infrastructure of contemporary 
corporate capitalism, and the crucial role of middle-class wives in signaling 
the trustworthiness and class status of corporate managers (1975 – 76: 55 – 
90). Her analysis suggests that corporate employers should be viewed as 
major beneficiaries of women’s unpaid work, along with the individual men 
whose careers are advanced. Finally, these approaches suggest that unpaid 
market labor plays an important role in constructing gendered identities. It 
may also be seen as a marker of heterosexual identity and privilege, though 
the literature does not discuss this dimension. 
Given the diversity of income-generating arrangements within families, it 
seems overly simplistic to demand that all participants be compensated in 
money for their work. It would be less controversial, however, to insist upon 
recognizing the value of unpaid market labor as an input to market 
production. This approach demands that we assess in a more contextua- 
lized fashion how to ensure equitable treatment of individuals who provide 
unpaid market labor. There is a parallel here to feminist analyses of unpaid 
domestic labor, many of which call for public policies to take the value and 
cost of care work into account and encourage equitable sharing of such 
work but not to commodify it as just another form of wage labor (Lourdes 
Beneria 1999: 300 – 3; Jean Gardiner 2000: 99 – 100; Susan Himmelweit 
2002; Lisa Philipps 2003: 13 – 14). To argue simply that unpaid market 
 labor should be eliminated by converting it to paid work risks further 
reifying the market/family dichotomy as the appropriate frame for public 
policy and individual subjectivity. Rather than extending the logic of 
competitive markets further into social life, Jenny Cameron and J. K. 
Gibson-Graham urge feminists to deconstruct the separation of production 
and reproduction by studying those spaces within the market that draw 
upon cooperative behavior (2003: 151 – 5). Research on unpaid market 
labor can contribute to this deconstructive project by revealing the extent 
to which families collaborate in work that officially belongs to an individual 
breadwinner. 
This last point raises the question of how unpaid market labor might fit 
into theories of the care economy. Certainly, it helps to reinforce the 
argument advanced by feminist economists that markets and households 
are interdependent aspects of the economy, both necessary for the 
production of wealth (Diane Elson 1998: 189; Nancy Folbre 2001; Marilyn 
Power 2004: 6). For example, Elson’s argument that unpaid care work 
maintains the social framework needed for market relations can be 
presented even more strongly when unpaid market labor is included in the 
picture, particularly the role that silent partners play in smoothing 
commercial relationships. More profoundly, demonstrating why unpaid 
market labor cannot be located comfortably in either the productive or 
 reproductive spheres helps expose the contingency of this boundary and 
challenge its legitimacy as a basis for allocating resources (David M. 
Brennan 2006). 
Foregrounding family members’ direct involvement in breadwinning 
challenges a central premise of much feminist work in political economy, 
which posits that industrial capitalism split waged work in the market from 
unwaged work in the household, replacing an earlier mode in which 
households functioned as common units of production and economic 
survival (Antonella Picchio 1992). As a consequence, feminist analyses of 
unpaid work in Western countries have tended to focus heavily on domestic 
and caregiving tasks. Some feminist research addresses subsistence 
production, a category that overlaps with the concept of unpaid market 
labor used in this paper, but typically it is studied in the context of less- 
developed, agriculturally based economies (Lourdes Beneria 1982: 131 – 2; 
2003: 108 – 16, 134 – 6). Studies of women’s informal work could be 
expanded to consider the issues discussed in this paper. The informal sector 
is generally defined to include unpaid family workers but also a wide array 
of other casual and sometimes illegal activities, usually undertaken to earn 
cash income and not necessarily embedded in family relations (Beneria 
1999: 290 – 1). Recently economists have questioned the traditional view 
that informal work recedes with industrialization and have begun to 
 consider its importance in the flexibilization of labor markets even in 
developed countries (Martha Chen 2004). 
If it can be shown that a wide range of market activities relies 
systematically upon the provision of unpaid market labor by family 
members, this suggests that market production has not entirely moved 
outside households even in Western economies. Thus, Jane Wheelock and 
Susan Baines concluded that work patterns in micro-businesses in North 
East England ‘‘showed the business family as a production unit,’’ in which 
survival depended heavily on a flexible supply of family labor both for the 
business and to address domestic needs (1998: 59). Their study indicates 
that informal and subsistence labor is crucial to economic development 
even in the most industrialized settings (Wheelock and Baines 1998: 62; 
Mark Granovetter 1995: 129 – 30). 
All this suggests that taking unpaid market labor seriously may both 
strengthen and complicate feminist political economy. While work on the 
care economy has successfully troubled the ideological dichotomization of 
market and household, it may also paradoxically reinforce it by calling up 
the family or the household as the site of only domestic (that is, non- 
market) activities. Feminist theory has tended to challenge the production/ 
reproduction boundary by imagining the household as an underpinning or 
source of essential inputs to the market, in the form of labor power and 
 cooperative social values (Isabella Bakker and Diane Elson 1998: 297; 
Philipps 2003). This conceptualization demonstrates the close linkages 
between caregiving and market productivity, but it can still coexist with the 
notion that paid work itself is an individual undertaking. Studying unpaid 
market labor has the potential to extend concepts of care beyond the work 
of nurturing people who then enter markets as autonomous individuals to 
better reflect the way family members work as a collective to reproduce the 
family household. In addition to showing the reciprocal flow of goods and 
services across the market/household boundary, then, highlighting unpaid 
market labor may go somewhat further to show how these spheres overlap 
and interweave. 
 
CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA  
This paper has identified unpaid market labor as a form of economic 
activity that cannot be fully understood as a mere subset of unpaid domestic 
or care work, nor as a form of labor-market participation per se. Rather, I 
have argued that unpaid market labor deserves its own analysis as a means 
of deepening feminist critiques of the ideological separation between 
production and reproduction, market and family. The tax cases from 
Canadian courts discussed in the first part of this paper illustrate some of 
 the ways in which paid workers may draw upon a family member’s 
assistance and how Canadian law presently characterizes that assistance 
dichotomously as either a market or domestic activity. Yet it is difficult to 
advise on the ‘‘correct’’ tax treatment of this form of unpaid labor without 
confronting the complex theoretical and political questions raised in the 
paper’s second part. Grappling with these questions will be critical in 
resolving policy debates, such as the recent one in Canada, over whether to 
allow couples to split income for tax purposes even where it is legally 
controlled by one of the partners alone (Frances Woolley 2007; Lisa 
Philipps 2006; REAL Women of Canada 2006). Conservatives advocating 
this form of notional income splitting have often cited the value of women’s 
unpaid work and may see the contribution of unpaid market labor as further 
bolstering this argument. Without attempting a full discussion here, a 
feminist analysis would focus attention on the intrahousehold distribution 
of resources and power, and whether tax benefits would be better 
provided directly to those doing unpaid market work, rather than 
indirectly through a tax reduction for the official breadwinner. It would 
assess whether income splitting offers differential benefits depending on 
factors such as class, racial and sexual identity, and family form. It would 
further evaluate the incentive effects of income splitting, including whether 
it encourages reliance on unpaid market labor or discourages the 
 formalization of employment or partnership relationships within house- 
holds, and it would evaluate these incentives against different visions of 
gender equality. 
Many other areas of public policy should also be reexamined through the 
lens of unpaid market labor. For example, how should this form of 
contribution affect property rights on marriage breakdown or inheritance 
rights? In corporate law, what protections should be afforded to those who 
provide unpaid market labor but have no legal status as directors, officers, 
employees, or shareholders? Do professional estate planners have legal or 
ethical obligations toward family members who have provided unpaid 
market labor to their client’s business (Alysa Christmas Rollock 1998: 567)? 
Corporate recruiters sometimes talk of hiring ‘‘two for the price of one,’’  
acknowledging that both members of a couple will be involved in performing a 
job that officially belongs only to one spouse (Kingston 2001: 27). Should 
such an employer have any responsibilities toward an executive spouse, for 
example, to provide a salary or a working environment free of harassment and 
discrimination? Conversely, is there a need to protect those without a female 
spouse from discrimination by employers who are looking for unpaid market 
labor that will advance corporate interests? 
A host of issues also arise in relation to self-employment. As Wheelock 
and Baines argue ‘‘the entrepreneurial character of the family, not just of 
 the individual, needs to be examined’’ (1998: 58). For example, are the 
lending policies of financial institutions or microcredit organizations fair 
towards unpaid family members who are involved in a business? Should 
government self-employment programs include more training and support 
for those who will assist the ‘‘entrepreneur,’’ including advice about their 
legal status and rights? For example, Binkley (2002) has observed that the 
income support and retraining programs designed to assist those impacted 
by the fisheries crisis on the Canadian East Coast were delivered only to 
licensed fishers, overwhelmingly men. They provided nothing to the wives 
who had been intimately involved in operating the family fishing business 
as shore crew or managers, failing to recognize the contributions and the 
economic losses of unpaid family members (Binkley 2002: 10 – 11). Making 
these questions visible, and developing answers to them, depends upon 
generating new theoretical and empirical knowledge about unpaid market 
labor. 
 
Lisa Philipps, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 
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1 While the Court cited this definition from the Partnership Act of Manitoba, the 
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